Dangerous Liaisons: the Left’s New Love Affair with Article I.
By M. Dylan McClelland*
Introduction
2006 brings the dawn of a new age- the Left is now enamored by Article I.1 In
fact legislative acts are now all encompassing, powerful enough to overrule the judicial
branch, the executive, and even the United States Constitution. The recent revelations
concerning National Security Agency surveillance have single-handedly turned the Left
into a new bastion of legislative zealots. This article examines through the lens of
privacy and rights jurisprudence the dogmatic shift of the Left as it doctrinally abandons
the judicial branch as a forum for policy-making.
Section I analyzes the history of the Left’s attack on undesirable legislation via
Rights’ arguments.2
Section II analyzes the current controversy over the lawfulness of the National
Security Agency’s intelligence gathering program involving wiretaps and electronic
surveillance conducted without Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant.3
Particularly, Section II analyzes the Constitutionality of the surveillance program under
the President’s inherent war powers authority granted by Article II of the United States
Constitution.
Section III concludes the Left’s recent attempts to subordinate the President’s
Article II war powers constitute not only an attempt to co-opt powers expressly granted to
the Executive Branch under the U.S. Constitution, but also mark a shift away from the
legal orthodoxy in which constitutional rights serve to invalidate undesirable state or
federal legislation. The article concludes that the Left is doctrinally stumbling into an
evisceration of its own chief instrument of public policy implementation. Such
overreaching will likely have rebounding unintended consequences.
Section I: Spearing Legislation: The Constitution as a Sword
A. Categorizing Radical Individualism
This article examines the history of the Left’s Constitutional jurisprudence as a
mechanism for political and social change. It is helpful, first, to accurately describe the
movement with which this article is concerned. Principally, “the Left” is not a pejorative.
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The label “Left” or the Left” is not a pejorative. See discussion, infra.
“Rights” or “rights” refers to the Bill of Rights through and including the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
The National Security Agency (NSA) program was disclosed by a New York Times article which
reported that President Bush had authorized the NSA to monitor the international telephone calls and
emails of U.S. citizens and residents without court-approved warrants. See, Dan Eggen, “Justice Dept.
Investigating Leak of NSA Wiretapping,” WASHINGTON POST, December 31, 2005, at A01.
2
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Likewise, this author does not presume to corral all persons who may share elements of
particular theories and ideologies in a broadly defined class.4
The Left as used herein describes the political/legal intellectual class devoted to radical
individualism and radical egalitarianism, and dedicated to imposition of those
philosophies through the courts.5 Such thinking is exemplified by the American Civil
Liberties Union, an organization whose myopic doctrine of the maximization of
individual rights through the judicial process is limited only by its twin devotion to group
equality.6
B. Understanding the Constitutional Framework of Shared and Exclusive
Powers.
A brief history lesson is appropriate in understanding the remarkable revolution
now sweeping the Left like a wildfire. The United States Constitution was at is founding
and is today, a magnificent political system: a doctrine of balanced powers among
branches and shared between the national and state governments.7 Simply, Article I
established the Congress, Article II the presidency, Article III produced the judicial
branch, and so forth.8 Recognizing the conflicts implicit in a federal republic, the
Founders made the national government one of limited and exclusive powers.9
4

The author does not define the Left to include, e.g., all liberals, or all Democrats, or all of any other group
which may share ideological agreement with the Left as defined in the discussion herein. Further, the
author is amusedly cautious of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that all classifications erected around
politically unpopular groups are unlawful and evil. See, discussion of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), infra.
5
See, Robert H. Bork, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, at p. 96 (1996).
6
Ibid. at p. 97. Bork argues that the ACLU’S brand of radical individualism which advocates, inter alia,
that nude dancing is protected free speech or that metal detectors in airports are an unlawful intrusion upon
private autonomy is internally discordant in that the organization favors more and substantial limits on
individual choices in areas such as affirmative action or employer’s rights. Id. at 97-98. The dichotomy of
favoring individual choice while rejecting electoral choice is explored more thoroughly by evaluating the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Romer v. Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas in particular, infra.
7
See, James Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 39. In Federalist No. 39, Madison extolled the virtues of the
Constitution’s framework: republican government neither wholly national in form nor wholly federal, a
framework equally deriving its authority from the consent of the majority and the confederation of states.
8
See, US CONST., ART I, §1[establishing Congress with all legislative powers], US CONST., ART II,
§1[vesting executive powers in the President of the United States], US CONST., ART III, §1[The judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts…], U.S.
Const., amend X [The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”].
9
James Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 39, “In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be
deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in
controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to
decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the
case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and
most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to
prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under
the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely
established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.”
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The Founders recognized that a system of co-equal states, while permitting
multiple experiments in self government, would require some national identity and
authority.10 Thus was borne a system in which the national government retained
exclusive authority over select issues of a national character, among others: national
defense,11 interstate commerce,12 immigration,13 a national bank.14 The wisdom of this
approach is beyond controversy. Would the nation prefer to still have Confederate
dollars or perhaps New Hampshire doubloons? Would it be desirable for a heavily
immigrated state such as California,15 or for Canadian- borne Michigan Governor
Jennifer Granholm16 to be vested with the power to regulate immigration and citizenship?
The Constitution’s foresight was genius. For its time, unheralded genius, but genius still
today.
Article I vested law and policymaking in the Congress, a model followed in each
state. Made up of elected members of the several states the Congress was intended to
reflect the people.18 The Left has never liked “populist” realism and so has sought to use
17
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Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 6 recognized not only the dangers to the Union from foreign states,
but also poignantly recognized,”A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the
subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To
presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that
men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of
independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform
course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.” Alexander Hamilton,
FEDERALIST NO. 6. See also, Alexander Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 9, “A FIRM Union will be of
the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and
insurrection.”
11
US CONST., ART II, §2[President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several states…]
12
US CONST., ART I, §8.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See, Jeffrey S. Passel and Wendy Zimmerman, “Are Immigrants Leaving California,” April 1, 2001 at
http://www.urban.org/publications/410287.html . Passel and Zimmerman in an Urban Institute Study find
that California leads the nation in immigrants.
16
Michigan Governor Granholm was born in Vancouver, British Columbia. See,
http://www.michigan.gov/gov/0,1607,7-168--57920--,00.html
17
See e.g., CAL. CONST. ART. IV, §1 (California), N.Y. CONST., Art. III, §1 (New York), MA CONST.,
Part the Second, Art. Ch. 1, §1, Art. I. (Massachusetts), FL CONST., Art. III, §1 (Florida). NE CONST.,
Art. III, §CIII-1 (Nebraska). Although Nebraska’s revised Constitution created only a unicameral
legislature, thus rejecting the two house framework of the United States and each of the other States, its
Constitution clearly vests the legislative power in that sole Legislative body. NE CONST., Art. III, §CIII1.
18
As Hamilton and/or Madison noted in Federalist No. 52, the most basic structures of the House of
Representatives were intended to reflect the people. Most pointedly these concerns were reflected in the
qualifications to be elected and the frequency and term of elections. FEDERALIST NO. 52. Hamilton and
Madison echoed this sentiment when they wrote “The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a
meeting of the citizens in person…” Id.
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judicial fiat to accomplish what it could not in state houses or ballot boxes.19 In each
instance, the Left has insisted that Constitutional imperatives, nearly always implicit,
must invalidate undesirable [in their perspective] legislation.
C. Griswold Forward: The Constitutional Sword of Legislating Privacy Rights
trough the Courts.20
The state of Connecticut circa 1958 through its popularly chosen representatives
enacted a law banning the use of contraceptives.21 The executive director and medical
director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut challenged the law after their
arrest under the statute.22 Following a tortured construction of the 14th Amendment and
the Bill of Rights, an implicit right to contraception emanated from the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights to invalidate the law.23 State legislative acts must yield to the 14th
Amendment, the Court held, where the two contradict.24 Griswold was notable in that the
Court created the constitutional conflict- the clash between marital privacy rights and the
Connecticut statute was judicially manufactured in that no such marital right to
contraception appears in the Constitution, and no married couple invoking said rights was
a party to the case.25 Griswold, in fact, inaugurated the beginning of the Left’s strategy
and preference for judicial policymaking.26
In 1992 the people of Colorado enacted Constitutional Amendment 2 by statewide
referendum, repealing all Colorado local ordinances to the extent they prohibited
19

As more fully developed in Section I, infra, the case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) is
illuminative. The Connecticut statute at issue was, in hindsight, likely quite silly. However, neither
legislative silliness, nor legislative imprudence requires judicial correction. California, for example,
criminalizes the act of battery disposal in ordinary trash. 22 Cal. Code Reg. 66273.2. Absent the crazed
lawbreaker who launches a used battery through a police station window, the California law’s inherent
unenforceability makes it uncommonly silly. cf., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 528 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The citizens and legislators of California and Connecticut are and were more than capable of
revising or eliminating these statutes through the legislative process. The single-minded focus on judicial
policy-making, thus, appears hostile to legislative democracy.
20
One might contend that the using the Constitution as a sword to invalidate state actions is structurally
incongruent with the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights in particular, is more aptly a
shield- a set of limits or protections from specific state actions.
21
Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-32 (1958 rev.)
22
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 482. Justice Douglas’ majority opinion noted that the Supreme Court does not “sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions.” The Court then invalidated the Connecticut statute based upon the privacy
rights of married couples, notwithstanding that the appellants were not a married couple prosecuted under
the statute. It is precisely the Court’s bootstrapping of privacy rights which inure to married couples to
invalidate the statute which evidences the Court was indeed sitting as a super-legislature.
25
The Court’s reasoning is both unremarkable and extraordinary. The opinion is unremarkable in that the
14th Amendment clearly invalidates any state law conflicting with a Constitutional right. See, Loving, v.
Virginia, Brown v. Board of Education, Casey v. Planned Parenthood, infra. Justice Douglas’ opinion is
remarkable in that it created the right [to contraception] used to invalidate the Connecticut law.
26
The Court would later concede that Griswold marked the most pertinent beginning point in its path of
using substantive due process to invalidate state statutes. See, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 528 (2003).
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discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation.27 The Supreme
Court struck down the statute on Equal Protection Clause grounds, holding that the
Amendment failed to meet even the rational basis test.28
Several things are illuminative about the Romer Court’s reasoning. First, the case
was a facial challenge to the entire Amendment.29 Second, unlike the petitioners in
Griswold, the parties lacked actual standing- none had sustained an injury in fact alleged
to have been caused by the amendment.30 Third, the Court appraised the conduct of the
voters of Colorado and determined it to be pernicious.31 As the Court noted:
“’If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare… desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.’”32
These three facts in particular weigh strongly in favor of the Court acting as a
super-legislature. Most notably, the combination of allowing plaintiffs with arguable
standing to facially challenge the entire Amendment evidences that not only the bringing
of the suit, but the Court’s invalidation of the Amendment was an act of political
preference, not legal judgment.
Also illustrative is the sweep of the Court’s unilateral assessment of the motives
of the Colorado electorate. The Court’s opinion concludes its inquiry: “We must
conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else…A State cannot so deem a class of persons a
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Colo. Const., Art. II, §30b, see also, Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996). Amendment 2 not only
repealed existing ordinances pertaining to protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, the Amendment likewise foreclosed further legislative action to create such protections. Id.
28
Id. at 633. The Court summarized the rational basis test thusly: “The search for the link between
classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause. It provides guidance and
discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limit
of our own authority. In the ordinary case a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate
government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if
the rationale for it seems tenuous.” Id. (citations omitted).
29
Id. at 641 (opinion of Scalia J., dissenting).
30
The case was filed seeking injunctive relief to enjoin the amendment’s enforcement. Id. at 625. Among
the plaintiffs were government entities that had enacted laws which would be invalidated by Amendment 2,
and homosexual persons who alleged that enforcement would subject them to immediate and substantial
risk of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. Id. The municipal entities arguably had a
greater standing claim as the Amendment’s language immediately invalidated the ordinances passed by
those locales to prohibit discrimination based upon sexual orientation. The individual plaintiffs, however,
possessed only a, in the Court’s words, risk of discrimination. Id. It is difficult to conceive of a human
being with any characteristics (i.e., a person with an identifiable age, gender, nationality, religion) who
might not likewise be under a theoretical immediate risk of discrimination based upon those traits.
31
Amendment 2 was enacted by popular referendum, not through the Legislature. The Court thus
undertook a puzzling inquiry of motive, ultimately concluding that the majority of voters were motivated
by animus.
32
Id. at 633 (citing, Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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stranger to its laws.”33 The Court’s own reasoning evidenced that the sole question was
whether a class of homosexuals may be singled out for disfavored treatment? Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion made clear that under the equal Protection Clause, a
homosexual class could not be disfavored.34
Having recognized the penultimate question that Amendment 2 posed the thenunique question of the proper legal status or preference which may be afforded a class of
homosexuals, the Court’s opinion is laid bare as a political act- a rejection of a political
opinion [that homosexuals as a class are not entitled to preference in non-discrimination
laws].35 Further, the mere fact that the Amendment 2 received a 46% “No” vote signifies
that it was a very closely waged political battle.36 Moreover, as the three dissenting
justices noted, a homosexual population of roughly 4% which garnered 46% of the
overall vote does not suggest a politically unpopular group singled out for disfavored
treatment.37 Rather, it reflected an ongoing political dialogue in which one side lost one
election. The political power of homosexuals has been borne out by other electoral
gains.38
Justice Scalia’s Romer dissent, among other scholarship, makes fair arguments
that the Romer majority’s opinion is irreconcilable with the Court’s prior decisions
upholding, for example, bans on polygamy or statutory forfeiture of voting rights by
felons and polygamists.39 Those particular arguments and comparisons however
provocative or substantial in their own right, are uninteresting to the primary question of
whether the trend towards preferential judicial policymaking has terminated with the
present National Security Agency wiretapping drama.

33

Id. at 637.
See fn. 23, supra.
35
In 1996 when Romer was decided, the Court’s Bowers v. Hardwick opinion [no due process right to
homosexual sodomy] was still considered good law as Lawrence v. Texas, see discussion infra, had not yet
been handed down, and the same-sex marriage “rebellion” sparked in Massachusetts and San Francisco,
among others, had not yet been sparked. Romer was a thus “unique for its time” analysis of homosexual
class rights. Likewise, the Canadian Supreme Court had not yet judicially compelled same-sex marriage as
it did in 2003 in Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL 34950 (Ontario Ct. App.). See also, Lawrence v. Texas,
supra 539 U.S. at 589(Scalia, J., dissenting).
36
Romer, supra at 653 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
37
Id.
34

Id at 645 (Scalia, J. dissenting), see also Louise Chu, “San Francisco voters approve
handgun, military recruiting bans,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 9, 2005. Voters
in the City and County of San Francisco overwhelmingly approved Measure I, banning
military recruiters from public schools and colleges. Whether the ban was directed at the
military’s policy on homosexuals, as is the university community’s challenge to the
federal Solomon Amendment, or was instead a symbolic repudiation of the Iraq War is in
question, but he gay rights’ issues likely played a role. See also, Stanley Kurtz, “San
38

Francisco to Army: Drop Dead. The perils of the counter recruitment movement,” THE WEEKLY
STANDARD, Volume 011, Issue 11 , Nov. 28, 2005 (discussing Measure I and the court challenge to the
Solomon Amendment).
39
Romer, supra, at 650 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The State of Texas enacted a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy.40 Two
individuals convicted under the law challenged its constitutionality.41 The Court
utilized the substantive due process rational basis test, as it did in Romer, to invalidate the
law again holding that the majority may not use the power of the State to enforce ethical
or moral principles.42
The question arises as to whether Lawrence is an example of judicial
policymaking? On the one hand, the case was a Constitutional challenge arising from the
criminal conviction of Lawrence and his co-defendant. These petitioners clearly had
standing and a right to seek redress through the courts. However, several factors betray
the opinion as judicial activism dismissive of pluralistic democratic process. First, the
Court rejected stare decisis and overruled an on-point opinion only 17 years old.43
Notably, the Court did not use a novel theory to circumvent its earlier holding in Bowers
v. Hardwick in reaching its decision in Lawrence. It did not, for example, adopt an Equal
Protection Clause analysis to avoid contradicting its earlier substantive Due Process
Clause analysis in Bowers. Instead, the Court simply revisited its earlier ruling and
overruled it. Second, the Court’s failure to apply its own recent precedent is itself
troubling. The mere overruling of precedent is not in itself proof of judicial
policymaking. However, in light of the fact that the Lawrence majority relied heavily on
its earlier opinion in Casey, to support its conclusion, the judicial policymaking
determination is perfunctory.44 The Court used Casey and its predecessor opinion in Roe
v. Wade to establish the due process liberty interest which protects the right to private
[homo] sexual conduct.45 The Court then overlooked, deliberately it seems, that Casey’s
rationale rested on stare decisis grounds.46 The Court, thus, used stare decisis to uphold
the identical substantive due process right [to privacy] in Casey which it upheld in
Lawrence by rejecting the same principle of stare decisis.47
Third, in settling an ongoing debate in the culture war, the Lawrence Court relied
heavily on both the arguments and evidence submitted by the American Civil Liberties
Union and on foreign law.48 The need to circumvent American constitutional law begs
40

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §21.06(a) (2003), see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 528 (2003). This Author
agrees with Justice Thomas who noted the Texas law was “uncommonly silly.” Id. at 604 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
41
Lawrence v. Texas, supra, at 563.
42
Id. at 574 (citing, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
Concededly, the Lawrence Court phrased its inquiry as a question (May the majority use the power of the
State to enforce ethical or moral principles…?) whereas this author paraphrased the Court’s inquiry as a
statement. However, that the court invalidated the statute on a mere rational basis inquiry [holding that the
statute did not have any legitimate governmental interest] provides a concrete basis on which to determine
the Court did in fact conclude that neither a State nor its people may enforce laws predicated upon social
mores or principles.
43
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey, supra, fn. 33.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 844-46, 854-869.
47
Whether there existed grounds on which to distinguish Casey from Lawrence on the stare decisis issue is
immaterial. The Court’ failure to even address the stare decisis issue is proof enough that the court reached
a desired policy result, and then bootstrapped an analysis.
48
See Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at 574-578. As Justice Scalia wrote in his Romer dissent, the issue of
how society is to treat homosexuals (whether opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as race or
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the question of whether the Court’s opinion was in fact based on Constitutional
jurisprudence or was simply a desired policy justified by any support the Court could
locate.
Fourth, the Court’s own opaque reasoning in overruling Bowers, but not
explicitly barring morals-based laws suggests tortured, results-oriented reasoning.49 By
concluding that the Court’s duty was to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own
moral code, the Court undertook the contrary. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
both reasoning and result, firmly rejects morality or the desire to preserve traditional
mores as a sufficient justification for class-wide treatment of homosexuals.50 Rejecting
tradition, or preservation of societal mores as a legitimate governmental interest would
have sufficed as at least a consistent substantive due process clause analysis.51 The
Court, however, immediately dismembered its own calculus.
Whether one agreed with the Court’s due process analysis or not, the analysis
could be justified as a reasonable extension of both the Court’s liberty analysis in Casey
and its appraisal of classwide disfavored treatment of homosexuals in Romer.52
Inexplicably, the Court immediately truncated its analysis by stating that its opinion did
not implicate “whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
homosexual persons seek to enter.”53
The Court’s statement is clearly designed to limit criticism that its decision in
Lawrence would mandate same-sex marriage. This is troubling and illustrative of the
dangers of judicial policymaking for several reasons. At a basic justiciability level, the
Court’s statement that Lawrence would not compel recognition of same-sex marriage, an
issue not before it, appears to lightly tread the chasm between dicta and an impermissible
advisory opinion.54
Next, the Court’s self-indulgent foray into same-sex marriage illustrates that it
was again cognizant of its intrusion into a cultural debate whose remedy lies in
religious bias) is precisely the cultural debate that gave rise to Amendment 2 in Colorado. See, Romer,
supra, at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Where the Constitution says nothing about this subject, it is left to be
resolved by normal democratic means. Id. Emphatically, the Court has no business deciding for the rest of
the country that disapproval or animosity toward homosexuals is evil. Id.
49
Specifically, the Court overruled the Bowers Court’s conclusion that a State’s interest in promoting social
mores or traditions could not justify the statute’s invasion of the petitioner’s liberty interest under
substantive due process analysis. The Court stated the “issue is whether the majority may use the power of
the State to enforce these [social] views.” Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at 570.
50
Id. (citing, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).). Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Bowers, adopted by the Lawrence majority, likening sodomy laws to miscegenation prohibitions,
concluded that neither tradition nor history could justify a law infringing upon a liberty interest. Id.
51
The Court concluded in Romer that singling out a class of homosexuals for disfavored treatment
amounted to bias and a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. Such animus could not constitute
a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause. Lawrence therefore could be seen as
a reasonable extension of the Romer equal protection analysis to substantive due process analysis.
52
See footnote 51, supra.
53
Lawrence, supra, at 578.
54
Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions. Article III requires that a federal court may
not issue opinions except in a case or controversy. See, US CONST. Art III, §2, see also, 13 Wright &
Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Section 3529.1 (1984) at p.298
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democratic procedures. 55 Most importantly, the Court’s desire to limit its own opinion is
a guilty “hand caught in the cookie jar” admission.
The Court clearly apprehended that its substantive due process analysis
would naturally encompass a subsequent claim that an individual’s liberty interest
protected the right to same-sex marriage. The Court’s eagerness to distance itself from
its own analysis betrays its recognition, and rejection of, the reasoning employed to
justify a preferred policy result. Nowhere in its other jurisprudence has the Supreme
Court gone to such pains to self-limit its own reasoning. The Court did not, for example,
in striking down Virginia’s miscegenation law on Equal Protection grounds mutilate its
own reasoning.56 In striking down the Virginia law banning interracial marriage the Court
reasoned "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry" are "odious to
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."57
The Loving Court’s reasoning was so unassailable that its command needed no
self limit. One could hardly imagine Chief Justice Warren writing,
“We hold the Virginia statute to be unconstitutional as an unlawful racial
classification and illegitimate violation of the liberty interest and right to
marry, but we do not mean to state by this opinion that individuals may
marry chipmunks or that necrophilia must be recognized by the State.”
Instead, the Court interpreted the law at issue in the context of both the Constitution’s
text and prior case law. Such is the business of judging. The Loving Court did not hurry
to qualify its analysis though some of its language might easily compel the requirement
of same-sex marriage or polygamy.58
The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses alone have not formed the sole
basis of attack of the Left’s assault on democratic legislation. A majority of the death
penalty states in the U.S. in 2005 permitted capital punishment for minors.59 Seventeen
year old Christopher Simmons was convicted of murder and sentenced to death under
Missouri’s death penalty statute.60 Simmons challenged his sentence under the 8th
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, notwithstanding that the
Supreme Court had held only fifteen years earlier that capital punishment was
constitutional as applied to seventeen year old’s.61
55

See fn. 48, supra.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57
Id. at 10 (citing, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).). The Court further stated, “To
deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these
statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.” Id.
58
The Loving Court wrote “Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very
existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190 (1888).” Id. The Court’s reasoning could easily compel a substantive due process right to polygamy
or same-sex marriage.
59
See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 609 (2005)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 556, 558.
61
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)
56
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Justice Kennedy again writing for the Court held the Missouri statute
unconstitutional as applied to minors on grounds that it violated the 8th Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.62 The Court invalidated the Missouri law,
reasoning that evolving standards of decency had demonstrated a national consensus that
the juvenile death penalty was cruel and unusual.63 Several features of the Court’s
opinion evidence the use of the 8th Amendment to dispatch legislation beyond the Left’s
democratic reach.
First, the Court rejected, as it did in Lawrence, its own recent precedent.64 Worse,
the Court did not reject its own reasoning in Stanford v. Kentucky on the grounds that it
was decided wrongly, but instead reasoned that the Constitution’s definition of cruel and
unusual had changed in the span of fifteen years.65 The mere reversal of precedent does
not necessarily imply a political rather than a judicial act, however, it is noteworthy that
the stare decisis reasoning used to prolong Roe’s vitality in Casey was then supported by
Justice Kennedy, but cast away in Roper.66
Second, the Court engaged in what can only be called mathematic
gymnastics to create a “national consensus” that the death penalty as applied to minors
was cruel and unusual. Earlier in Stanford the Court had opined that whether a national
consensus exists should be determined by reference to state statutes.67 Justice Scalia’s
Roper dissent recognized the Court found a national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty because 18 states barred juvenile capital punishment.68 As Justice Scalia so aptly
stated, “Words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of the death penalty States
can constitute a national consensus.”69
Third, is the abundant democratic hostility of the Court’s reasoning. By devising
an analysis which ignored precedent and looted the definition of “consensus” by defining
it to include less than a simple majority, the Court clearly toiled to reach a result its
earlier Stanford reasoning would not embrace.70 Importantly, by declaring the juvenile
death penalty to be per se unconstitutional the Court forever removed the debate of the
policy’s propriety from the people or their elected representatives.71 Indeed, those 18
States lauded by the Court as a national consensus are now forever foreclosed from

62

Roper, supra, at 565-57.
Id.
64
See, Stanford v. Kentucky, supra.
65
Roper v. Simmons, supra at 608 (2005)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
66
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reconsidering their policies.72 It is an open question whether legislators in those states
would have voted for the bans were they aware that their vote would be sealed in bedrock
for all eternity by the Court, or had they been advised their vote on what may very well
have been a public policy experiment, might be used to decide the same issue in every
other State in the Union.73 Indeed, a more provocative question might be the impact of
other state policy experiments in euthanasia, medical marijuana, or mandatory health
insurance?74 The fifty state laboratories are likely imperiled by the Court’s broad swath.
As the Supreme Court noted twenty years ago in another death penalty case, “In a
democratic society legislature, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people.”75 The Roper opinion is thus evidenced as
judicial hostage taking of what are properly questions for the people and their
legislatures. Justice Scalia noted this in his Roper dissent, pointing out, “By what
conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the
Nation.”76
Fourth, is the Court’s reference to foreign law and the advocacy of certain Leftoriented groups.77 Again the contrast between Casey and Roper is instructive. The
American Psychiatric Association’s amicus brief played a role in the Court’s conclusion
that juveniles lack the cognitive development to appreciate their actions when embarking
on a capital crime.78 However, fifteen years earlier the American Psychiatric Association
opined in Hodgson v. Minnesota, that juveniles were mature enough to decide whether to
obtain an abortion.79 Ignoring its own precedent the Roper Court simply “look[ed] over
the heads of the crowd and picked out its friends.”80
Section II: The War on the War Powers
And so now the Left comes to the NSA’S “domestic wiretapping.”81 Specific
details of the covert program are scant, but the general thrust of the program appears to
be that beginning in early 2002 the NSA began monitoring telephone numbers and email
addresses discovered in the computers, cell phones, and address books of captured Al
72
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Qaeda operatives.82 The surveillance program is focused primarily (71)%) on foreign
targets, but has included the monitoring of communications with persons in the United
States.83
The Administration’s warrantless surveillance of calls between some US citizens
and members of Al Qaeda is lawlessness run amok, exalts a reinvigorated and excited
Left. The President may be impeached for this, warns Democratic Senator Barbara
Boxer – a model of Leftist dialogue and theory- because he has admitted he did not
follow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).84 The charge may have
factual merit, but as discussed, infra, is legally askew.
FISA governs electronic surveillance for “foreign intelligence information .“85
FISA states a President may get judicial approval from a FISA court to obtain foreign
intelligence information.86 FISA permits the Executive Branch to seek a warrant to
conduct surveillance before or 72 hours after conducting a search or surveillance in
foreign intelligence cases.87 The Bush administration has offered two principal
justifications for the NSA program: 1) the Congressional Authorization for Use of
Military Force passed after the September 11th attacks and; 2) Constitutional authority.88
While the former almost certainly justifies the NSA program, this article concerns only
the Constitutional Article II justification.89 Article II, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution states,
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“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service
of the United States.”90
The Left maintains that the NSA program violates the FISA warrant requirement
and is, hence, unlawful. What arises is a fundamental contradiction between an explicit
article of the Constitution and a federal statute.91 It is an elemental inquiry into whether
Congress can act as a check on the Executive’s war powers going to the basic principles
of the Constitutional structure.92
As a threshold question, this inquiry demands a determination of whether the
United States is in fact at war such that the Executive’s Article II war powers are
invoked? The absence of a formal Congressional declaration of war in this instance is
unpersuasive. Likely dispositive is the Authorization for Use of Military Force which
declared the President may use “all necessary and appropriate force” against nations,
organizations, and persons associated with the September 11th attacks.93 The
Congressional Authorization clearly intended and authorized use of the American
military forces. As Commander in Chief of those forces the President’s war powers are
necessarily implicated.94 The Supreme Court confirmed this when it reasoned that
“There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in
Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the Al
Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to
target in passing the AUMF.95 The NSA program is directed at Al Qaeda and its
members and supporters.96 Thus, the President’s Article II war powers are involved.
That the War on Terror crosses transnational boundaries including the borders of
the United States, or that it implicates citizens of numerous nations including this
Nation’s, only serves to heighten the Constitutional powers delegated to the Executive,
not to diminish them. As Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in Federalist No. 74,
“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power
by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common
strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength,
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
authority.”97
90

U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 2.
One should note that Article II is an explicit clause of the Constitution. For decades the Left has used
implicit rights, e.g., in Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence, to invalidate Congressional and state legislative acts.
92
cf., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 580. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
93
115 Stat. 224
94
U.S. CONST., ART. II, §2: “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United
States…”
95
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 518.
96
See, Tell, supra, at fn. 81.
97
FEDERALIST NO. 74, see also, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 581. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91

13

The Supreme Court has long paid heed to Article II’s plenary grant of power to
the Executive branch in its exclusive delegations.98 In addressing the President’s foreign
affairs’ powers in 1936 the Court reasoned the President “has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.”99
As Justice Thomas recognized in his Hamdi dissent, judicial interference in the foreign
affairs domain destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a unitary
Executive.100
The FISA law itself contains a check in that a FISA warrant requires a
certification from a national security officer.101 Nonetheless, some on the Left have
charged that the Administration’s interpretation of Executive power leads to an
unchecked presidency.102 The Founders considered and rejected such a contention. The
Constitution provides a check to the Executive’s power over the military by vesting in the
Legislative Branch the sole authority to raise armies, and to declare war.103 But that the
Constitution vests the war making authority in the President seems beyond dispute.104
Thus, the Constitution’s own internal framework checks Presidential power while at the
same time energizing the Executive. Congress likely has many checks on the program
including defunding the program or the NSA entirely, but rewriting the President’s
Article II war powers is not one of those options.
Nor is the uniqueness of this war a substantive charge. That the war on terror
might last for years, decades, or even generations does not lessen the Constitutional
gravamen set forth in Article II, Section 2. National security surveillance by its very
nature differs from criminal justice surveillance and is often long range and interrelates
various sources and types of information.105 That it might embrace technologies never
contemplated by the Founders, or be fought among bits, bytes, and radio waves does not
diminish the wisdom of Article II’s delegation to the Executive. As Hamilton wrote in
1787,
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“The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power
to which the care of it is committed.”106
The very issue posed by the NSA Program is nothing less than the authority of the
President to conduct war. The Supreme Court has long recognized the President has
constitutional authority to protect the national security and that such authority carries
broad discretion.107
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review sidestepped this critical
issue in 2002.108 In In re: Sealed Case the FISA Court of Review rejected restrictions in
a foreign surveillance warrant placed on the government by a FISA judge based on both
statutory and constitutional grounds.109 In that case, the trial court granted a Justice
Department application for a FISA court order, but further required that certain other
restrictions be met, including that the Department’s “law enforcement officials shall not
make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation,
continuation or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances.”110 This was the nowfamous “wall” between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations referred to at
length in the 911 hearings, and Congressional debates over the Patriot Act.111
The FISA Court of Review invalidated the restrictions placed on the warrant on
several grounds, the consideration of which illuminate the Constitutional question at issue
here. Most importantly, the Court of Review reversed the lower court’s restrictions on
the grounds that the court’s order unconstitutionally usurped the Executive Branch’s
powers.112 Specifically, the court concluded that the lower court’s order impermissibly
interfered with the Attorney General’s Article II authority to determine how to deploy
personnel resources.113 The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s language in Morrison v.
Olson wherein the Supreme Court cautioned the D.C. Circuit to avoid administrative
guidance to the Independent Counsel as actions having “serious constitutional
ramifications.”114
Thus, the Court of Review recognized specifically in the FISA warrant context that the
FISA warrant process can, and in that case did, tread dangerously close to Constitutional
separation of powers issues.
The Court of Review’s rejection of the lower court’s restrictions [on the court
order approving surveillance] was ultimately based on a statutory analysis of FISA and a
finding that FISA amplified the President’s power by providing a mechanism that at least
106
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approaches a classic warrant and which therefore supported a conclusion that the FISA
searches were constitutionally reasonable.115 The Court, however, did take for granted
that the President did have constitutional authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes.116
Next, the Court of Review explored without extending, the Supreme Court’s
holding in its Keith decision.117 The Supreme Court in Keith adopted the view that a
more relaxed warrant could suffice in domestic intelligence searches.118 The Court of
Review noted the Keith Court had avoided the issue of warrantless foreign intelligence
searches, however, the Court elected not to take the next step and explicitly follow the
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Truong and embrace Keith’s unanswered query.119 In that
the Court had already concluded reversal was required based on the FISA statute itself,
and in that it had already assumed the President’s inherent authority to conduct
warrantless foreign intelligence searches, the Court’s decision not to overtly answer
Keith’s unanswered question was likely more a question of judicial restraint rather than
substantive deliberation.
Indisputably, FISA exists and the President apparently did not use its warrant
provisions before or after conducting the NSA surveillance. However, FISA is an act of
Congress, not a constitutional article. The President is vested, by Article II, with an
inherent authority to conduct war. The Founders took care in making this delegation
plenary:
“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power
by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common
strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength,
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
authority.”120
That Congress through FISA gave the Executive an additional basis upon to
which exercise its constitutional powers was considerate, but in a time of war such a
legislative grant is redundant and, in this case, unconstitutionally inimical to the
separation of powers.121 Analogously, Congress might also pass a law authorizing the
President to receive ambassadors, or authorizing itself to pass laws relating to interstate
115
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commerce, naturalization, or bankruptcy. But such laws are duplicative of inherent
powers under the Constitution.122 While Congress might legislatively bless certain
plenary powers of the President, it cannot remove them.123
Section III: Noseless Victories: The to Legislate or Not to Legislate Quandary
In the case of the NSA’S surveillance program the Left has finally discovered
Article I and has decided that they like FISA more than the Constitution. Thus, they face
an intellectual and practical dilemma. They can continue to insist that FISA somehow
subverts or supplants the explicit and plenary war powers granted by Article II to the
Executive Branch. Or the Left can protect decades of jurisprudential wizardry and
concede to the Executive the Constitution’s explicit endowment.
Continuing to rely upon Article III courts as a venue for preferential policymaking
carries its own risks, however. The intrinsic dilemma posed by judicial lawmaking is that
each case addresses only one policy. The selective and myopic use of the courts to
reverse democratic failures can produce unintended consequences and Noseless
Victories.124 The Left’s obsession with two issues, abortion and capital punishment,
provides an illustration.125
Abolition of the death penalty has long been a shibboleth of the Left.126 In 2004
that objective came closer to reality when the Supreme Court abolished the juvenile death
penalty in Roper. However, in implementing its litigation strategy the Left arguably
dynamited the foundations of the right to abortion. As discussed previously, the right to
abortion narrowly escaped judicial reversal in Casey, surviving on the slimmest string of
stare decisis.127
In Roper as well as in Lawrence, the Supreme Court turned its back on recent
precedent and impliedly cast away stare decisis as a defining judicial principle.128
Further, Casey and Roper both made an important doctrinal shift in constitutional
analysis: each allowed for changes in science and mankind’s knowledge of itself justify
122
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abandoning precedent and rewriting both the constitutional inquiry and the analysis by
which it is made. In Casey, the Court altered its trimester inquiry established in Roe,
replacing it with a more flexible viability standard precisely because medical
advancements had revealed Roe’s trimester system to be inconsistent with scientific
fact.129
Roper too, used science to justify its result. In determining that evolving
standards of decency forbade execution of minors under the age of eighteen, the Court
relied heavily on the science of psychology. The Court girded its opinion on scientific
evidence that juveniles’ lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are, thus, more understandable among the
young.130 In so doing the Court relied heavily on the amicus briefs of the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the treatises on juvenile psychology and child
development cited therein.131
As discussed briefly in Section I, the APA opined in earlier abortion cases that
juveniles did posses the requisite maturity to make moral choices about abortion yet
supplied science to the contrary in Roper. It may very well be that that the science of
child development and neurology had evolved in the intervening years.132 Nonetheless a
significant nomological predicament has been posited.
Casey, though upholding Roe, left room for refinements to its central holding
based on evolving science in maternal health and fetal development.133 This “slidingstick” holding left Roe untouched only by yet to be discovered science. Science in its
present state, now defines fetal viability as early as 23 weeks in contrast to Roe’s
formulary of 28 weeks.134 Of course, Casey’s principal foundation was stare decisis, a
judicial cornerstone ripped conveniently asunder in Roper and Lawrence. The Left,
hence, must now contemplate the very real possibility that its single-minded quest to
overturn the death penalty may have laid a jurisprudential basis for Roe’s reversal.
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Indeed, the United States Supreme Court had agreed to review the
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a statute which the Court
held unconstitutional only six years ago.135 Moreover, the United States’ chief contention
in that case is that the volume of medical knowledge available now concerning the partial
birth abortion procedure raises doubts as to the continued vitality of the Court’s 2000
opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart.136
The unintended consequences at play between Roper, Lawrence, and Casey
illustrate the hyper-folly in judicial legislation. Their interaction also illustrates the
dilemma the Left faces in confronting the NSA program. Literal adherence to a
Congressional act the Left in this case prefers (FISA), in opposition to explicit powers
granted under Article II may erode a decades old and largely successful strategy of using
the Constitution, implicit or explicit, to accomplish unreachable policy gains.
Conversely, the Left could embrace their newfound love for Article I democracy,
and maintain that the courts are no longer the place for public policy battles. This might,
however, prove unworkable in the majority of the country where the Left’s secular
agenda of gay marriage, rights for Guantanamo Bay terrorists, abortion on demand, and
opposition to the Pledge of Allegiance are unpopular.137 Democracy can be so very
pedestrian and unaccommodating; nothing like the high octane intelligence required of
public policy by Constitutional jurisprudence.138
Or, the Left could admit that it is only some acts of legislation, and some clauses
of the Constitution, which they prefer. For example, the 8th Amendment139 or the churchstate wall of separation clause of the 1st Amendment.140 The Second Amendment seems
135

See, “Supreme Court to take up late-term abortion issue,” USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006.
See, Pet. Brief, Gonzales v. Carhart, Case No. 05-380, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/2pet/7pet/2005-0380.pet.aa.html . (“Although the [Appeals] court
conceded that Stenberg did not stand for the proposition that "legislatures are forever constitutionally
barred from enacting partial-birth abortion bans," it determined that legislatures could enact such bans only
if, "at some point (either through an advance in knowledge or the development of new techniques, for
example), the procedures prohibited by the Act will be rendered obsolete."].”
137
See e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra (captured detainees can challenge basis for confinement in federal
court), Am. Civil Liberties U., Press release, “ACLU of Colorado Challenges Law Forcing Public School
Teachers and Students to Recite the Pledge of Allegiance,” Aug. 12, 2003, at
http://www.aclu.org//religion/schools/16064prs20030812.html, National Organization of Women supports
same-sex marriage at http://www.now.org/issues/lgbi/marr-rep.html, Am. Civil Liberties U., Press release,
“Following Passage of Gay Marriage Bans in 11 States, ACLU Vows to Continue Striving for Equality,”
Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/12430prs20041103.html.
138
See generally, Stephen Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION ( 2005). Justice Breyer’s theory of “active liberty” sees the Court’s noble role in
shaping policy as essential in achieving the constitution’s democratic objective. How this thought is
reconcilable with the Court’s rewriting legislation and invalidating popularly enacted referenda is both
beyond the scope of this article as well as facially and arrogantly dismissive of popular republican
democracy.
139
See discussion of Roper v. Simmons, supra, Section I.
140
The author notes no such clause exists, but the separation of church and state interpretation of the First
Amendment is a sacred cow of the Left. See, http://www.aclu.org/religion/index.html (“The establishment
clause requires the separation of church and state.”).
136

19

unpreferred.141 Congress’ interstate commerce power? Unpreferred where interstate
commerce power is used to block Internet taxes, medical marijuana, or federal gun free
school zones.142 To support federal minimum wage and other labor laws or to authorize
environmental regulations, Article I Section 8 will suffice nicely.143 Federal immigration
power will do if it requires the states to keep funding the medical care and education of
illegal aliens.144 Federal overreaching and bigotry if the immigration power seeks to
control the borders or regulate drivers’ licenses.145
Section IV: Conclusion
Ultimately, picking and choosing when and which clauses of the Constitution
matter, could become a time consuming process interfering with, for example, the
impeachment of George Bush or the Lawrence-driven push for same-sex marriage. As
demonstrated above, the single minded pursuit of abolishing the death penalty through
the courts may have sown the seeds of Roe’s reversal. Continued insistence that FISA
overrides constitutionally-endowed Executive authority is the type of jurisprudential
argument likely to cause unintended consequences for later policy debates.
Or perhaps this new love affair is just a tryst, a one night fling to be
forgotten as soon as its enjoyment (or George W. Bush) is gone?
* M. Dylan McClelland is a Sacramento-based author, litigator and appellate counsel.
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